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Abstract: The decades preceding the Great Depression and the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis have close similarities. Both decades were characterized by rapid 
growth without major contractions, by an increase in liquidity, a lack of inflation, and 
a generalized decrease in risk premiums. Additional similarities included significant 
changes in the financing of real estate by commercial banks along with a 
consolidation of the banking sector and high hopes that the efficiency of monetary 
policy would prevent financial crises. These decades were also characterized by the 
consolidation of the powers of young central banks (the Federal Reserve System in 
the 1920s and the European Central Bank in the 2000s), by unsuccessful attempts to 
control market speculation, by their international dimensions, and by the eruption of 
crises after the failure of a major American financial institution that could have been 
avoided. Understanding these analogies help us better identify the causes of the 
subprime mortgage crisis and prevent history from repeating itself to the extent of 
such large-scale devastating consequences.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Until recently the conventional opinion was that major disruptions in 
financial markets characterized by sharp declines in assets and firm failures would 
always exist but that financial crises of the type experienced during the Great 
Depression were a thing of the past for advanced countries such as the United States 
or the countries of the European Union. The 2007–9 crisis proved them wrong. 
Analogous circumstances triggered similar crisis dynamics. The periods from 
1921 to 1929 and 2001 through 2007 both experienced fairly rapid growth without 
major contractions, which led to a climate of confidence, highly decisive for the 
outbreak of the crisis. These periods were characterized by the following aspects, in 
the order of importance for the outbreak of the crisis: (1) developments in finance 
that modified the role of commercial banks; (2) an increase in liquidity at the global 
level that did not lead to inflation but caused risk premiums to decrease; (3) a 
banking sector that became concentrated in number and size of banks; and (4) a 
strong belief in the capacity of central banks to promote economic stability and to 
prevent financial crises in the long run. 
These two financial crises started with severe defaults on mortgages that led 
to significant loan losses on bank balance sheets. Both crises erupted in periods of 
high uncertainty after the failure of a major American financial institution: the Bank 
of the United States in 1930 and Lehman Brothers in 2008—and both failures could 
have been avoided. While the failure was believed to have domestic consequences at 
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the time, the decision to let them go bankrupt was a mostly decisive cause for the 
dramatic outbreak of the international crises. 
Both crises consolidated the powers of young central banks, at the time of 
the Great Depression it was the young Federal Reserve System and of the subprime 
crisis, it was the recently founded European Central Bank. 
The Banking Acts of 1933 (Glass–Steagall) and 1935 created the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), separated commercial banking from the 
securities industry, prohibited interest on checkable deposits, restricting such 
deposits to commercial banks, and placed interest-rate ceilings on other deposits. 
The fact that less than a decade after the demise of the Glass–Steagall Act, a similar 
crisis appeared, and that in March to September 2008, all five of the largest, free-
standing investment banks ceased to exist in their old form hint to the fact that the 
Great Depression and the Great Recession may have similar causes. Understanding 
these causes will help in rebuilding a regulatory framework that is capable of 
preventing such occurrences in the future. 
 
2. Close similarities of the periods 1921–1929 and 2001–2007 
2.1. Rapid growth without contractions 
 
The absence of a severe depression over almost a decade could have caused 
apprehension2, but instead it had the opposite effect: the longer a significant 
depression was avoided, the greater confidence in the future became. 
In the United States, the declines of 1920–21 and 2000–2001 were followed 
by economic expansions. From 1921 to 1929, two recessions occurred: one from 
May 1923 to July 1924, and the other from October 1926 to November 1927. These 
recessions slowed steady growth but they were so mild and brief that most people at 
the time did not realize a recession had occurred. 
The steady economic growth from 2001 to spring 2007 can only be explained 
by the continuous expansion of credit. In 2001, the Federal Reserve implemented an 
expansive policy to support the depressed economic climate and productivity, and 
get companies that had borrowed a lot during the stock market boom of the 1990s 
out of debt. But the bankruptcies that occurred in 2002 because of bad corporate 
governance—the most famous being that of Enron in December 2001—forced the 
Federal Reserve to continue its expansive policy in order to prevent deflation. 
Beginning in 2003, economic growth was strongly sustained by household 
consumption triggered by low long-term interest rates. The transfer of corporate 
debt to household debt sustained American growth. 
 
2.2. Increase in global liquidity 
 
From July 1921 to the cyclical peak in August 1929 the stock of money in the United 
States rose at a rate of 4.6 percent per year, that is, by 45 percent for the whole 
period. Of this rise, the increase in the public’s deposit–currency ratio accounted for 
54 percent, in the banks’ deposit–reserve ratio—15 percent, and in the stock of high-
powered money—27 percent. Beginning in 1929, money stock declined very slightly 
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as a result of the restrictive monetary measures taken by the Federal Reserve System 
in response to the stock market boom. 3 
If we take into consideration the ratio between the stock of money and the 
gross domestic product for the six main monetary zones (the United States, the 
eurozone, Japan, China, the United Kingdom, and Canada), we can see that it goes 
from 18 percent during 1980–2000 to more than 26 percent in 2002, and to almost 
30 percent in 2006–7. 4 This rise in liquidity can be explained by external causes such 
as a very rapid increase in the exchange reserves of the emerging countries 
(particularly, of China) and of the countries exporting raw materials. The rise in 
reserves is the result of significant commercial trade surpluses as well as the high 
savings rate of these countries that had high growth rates for several years. The 
expansion of credit—caused by the fall in interest rates, the development of financial 
innovations, and the search for economic growth—is the major internal cause of this 
rise in global liquidity. The increase in liquidity did not lead to inflation in either 
period. 
 
2.3. Lack of inflation 
 
In spite of the widespread belief that inflation was very high before 1929 in the 
United States, the 1920s were not an inflationary decade. By 1923, wholesale prices 
had recovered only a sixth of their 1921 decline. From 1923 to 1929, they fell an 
average of 1 percent per year. Prices remained low during the cyclical expansion 
beginning in 1927. The stock market grew at a fairly steady rate until early 1928. 
Afterward it declined very slightly until 1929 as a result of the restrictive monetary 
measures taken by the Federal Reserve System. 5 
In the 2000s, the increase in liquidity on a global scale was caused by the 
rapid growth of exchange reserves of central banks in emerging countries and in 
countries exporting raw materials (an external factor), as well as credit expansion (an 
internal factor). Generally speaking, an increase in liquidity leads to inflation on 
prices for goods and services, but the databases of the International Monetary Fund 
from 1996 to 2006 show the opposite:6 in spite of an increase in liquidity, inflation 
continued to decline worldwide from 12 percent to less than 4 percent. 
Kenneth Rogoff explains the generalized decrease in inflation as a result of 
pressure caused by decreased prices for manufactured goods from emerging 
countries (in spite of pressure caused by these same countries on prices of raw 
materials).7 The excess productivity capacities of emerging countries, which have low 
wage costs, continued to influence prices and contributed to noninflationist 
economic growth. And the significant rise in prices for oil, metals, and food products 
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as a result of the demand of emerging countries was not strong enough to reverse the 
tendency. Inflation and its volatility went down. 
The expansion of credit is normally limited by a rise in inflation that has the 
consequence of tightening monetary policy and interest rates. The fact that inflation 
went down led to a substantial development of credit in the 2000s. 
 
2.4. Falling risk premiums 
 
Risk premiums fell during the 1920s in the United States. As Ilse Mintz explains,8 
basic yields on 30-year bonds, which can be regarded as representative for the high-
grade domestic bond market, declined from 4.50 percent to 4.05 percent between 
1925 and 1928. In other words, the “scarcity of quality loans” meant that the investor 
had to accept a 10 percent decline in nominal yield. In 1925 the average risk 
premium for issues of foreign bonds, 30 percent of which subsequently proved to be 
of bad quality, was 2.18 percent. In 1928 a crop of foreign bonds, 65 percent of 
which were failures, could be sold to yield no more than a 2.00 percent risk premium. 
Thus investors accepted an 8 percent reduction in risk premium for a much riskier 
investment at the very time they accepted only a 10 percent reduction in yields on 
high-grade investments of stable quality. This caused the prices of risky foreign 
bonds to rise relatively more than prices of high-grade domestic bonds. 
Mintz emphasizes that high-grade foreign loans might have been expanded if 
American investors had accepted a more drastic cut in their yields. The public’s 
demand for high-yield bonds excluded borrowers who offered lower yields. To a 
certain extent the lower-grade bonds drove the high-grade bonds from the market. 
But this was not the only reason why low-grade bonds attracted investors. Investors 
bought low-grade bonds because they were not aware of the risks they were taking. 
And this underappreciation of risk was not the result of the influence of a few 
fraudulent investment bankers. It was rooted in the optimistic economic climate of 
the twenties. During the entire decade, there were no defaults on foreign government 
bonds. Bad risks accumulated but did not become apparent. The confidence of 
bankers and investors grew as time passed and no losses were incurred. 
This confidence was strengthened by the considerable profit made by 
investors over a long period. Moreover, these profits furnished funds for more 
investments of the same kind. Even those who were aware of the cyclicity of the 
economic activity were reassured by the mild contractions of the twenties, which 
passed without inflicting losses on foreign bondholders and left the impression that 
depressions were a thing of the past. This optimism had a cumulative effect. The new 
lending it encouraged was used to pay old debts when other funds were not available, 
thereby prolonging the life of bad debtors, postponing defaults, and in turn causing 
investors to have greater confidence in a future without crises. 
History repeated itself, and in the 2000s inflation, stabilization, less 
fluctuation of gross domestic product (GDP) and its components, improved 
macroeconomic conditions, and the modernization of the financial structures of 
emerging countries favored a climate of confidence. Under these circumstances, risk 
premiums went down. For example, on the bond markets, premiums were about 300 
basis points in 2000 for BAA ratings and about 800 basis points for the Emerging 
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Markets Bond Index +, the spread being about 500 basis points. The spread 
continued to decrease to 300 basis points in 2005, and almost disappeared at the 
beginning of 2007.9 
The cause is clear: with the increase in liquidity, economic players searched 
for riskier assets in order to obtain better returns. More and more risks were taken 
without being correctly remunerated as the volatility of inflation decreased and global 
liquidity remained significant. This set the conditions for an economic downturn but 
the economic players did not acknowledge it and strongly believed in the capacity of 
central banks to ensure the stability of the system. 
 
2.5. Large real estate financing by commercial banks 
 
In both periods in the United States, borrowers had facilitated access to real estate 
and the quality of collateral dropped significantly before the crisis erupted. Both 
crises began with severe defaults on mortgages that led to significant loan losses on 
bank balance sheets. 
A regulatory framework evolved and American national banks were able to 
start financing nonfarm real estate in 1916 after an amendment to the Federal 
Reserve Act, and later with the implementation of the McFadden Act of 1927. Thus, 
during the 1920s, commercial loans declined noticeably compared to loans on real 
estate and securities. 
Loans made in the late 1920s had a larger frequency of default and 
foreclosure than those issued a decade before. This was the result of deterioration in 
collateral requirements. The origination standards were relaxed because of: (1) 
optimism resulting from the high prosperity of the twenties, and (2) less demand for 
commercial loans, which was caused by a shift from bank loans to public issues of 
stocks and bonds as a way for companies to raise funds. Based on a sample of loans 
made by 116 commercial banks, Carl F. Behrens shows that for urban mortgages, 
foreclosure rates on loans issued in the late 1920s were four times greater in number 
and eight times greater in amount than in the early 1920s.10 J.E. Morton arrived at 
similar conclusions for the same periods for a sample of two classes of commercial 
bank mortgage loans: nonfarm homes and income-producing properties.11 
By June 1930, credit market conditions had stabilized and stocks recovered 
almost half of their losses. But severe droughts in the Midwest led to a sharp decline 
in agricultural production, with the result that farmers could not repay their bank 
loans. The resulting defaults on farm mortgages led to significant loan losses on bank 
balance sheets. These difficulties combined with the weakness of rest of the 
economy, and caused the first bank panic in November and December 1930. The 
stock market fell sharply. Bank panics succeeded one another until March 1933 when 
President Roosevelt declared a bank holiday. By this time, more than one-third of 
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American commercial banks had failed and bank panics had spread all over the 
world. 
Before 2000, only prime borrowers could obtain residential mortgages. In the 
2000s, the deregulation of the financial system and development of the originate-to-
distribute banking model led commercial banks to finance subprime mortgages. The 
Federal Reserve accurately describes the subprime population:12 
 
Generally, subprime borrowers will display a range of one or more 
credit-risk characteristics, such as: 
• two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months, or one or 
more 60-day delinquencies in the last 24 months; 
• judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 
months; 
• bankruptcy in the last five years; 
• relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a 
credit bureau risk 
• score (FICO)13 of 660 or below (depending on the product or 
collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent default 
probability likelihood; or 
• debt-service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater, or an 
otherwise limited ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total 
monthly debt-service requirements from monthly income. 
 
The Federal Reserve experts were aware of the risk of purchasing these risky 
credits at high margins by other banks as explained in the section on “Purchase 
Evaluation” written in November 2002: 
 
As they evaluate expected profits, institutions that purchase subprime loans 
from other lenders or dealers must give due consideration to the cost of 
servicing these assets and to the loan losses that may be experienced. For 
instance, some lenders who sell subprime loans charge borrowers high up-
front fees, which are usually financed into the loan. This provides incentive 
for originators to produce a high volume of loans with little emphasis on 
quality, to the detriment of a potential purchaser. Further, subprime loans, 
especially those purchased from outside the institution’s lending area, are at 
special risk for fraud or misrepresentation (that is, the quality of the loan may 
be less than the loan documents indicate).14 
 
In the section “Securitization and Sale”, the Federal Reserve experts insist on 
the risks of securitizing: 
 
 To increase their loan-production and –servicing income, some subprime 
lenders originate loans and then securitize and sell them in the asset-backed 
securities market. Strong demand from investors and favorable accounting 
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rules often allow securitization pools to be sold at a gain, providing further 
incentive for lenders to expand their subprime-lending program. However, 
the securitization of subprime loans carries inherent risks, including interim 
credit risk and liquidity risks, which are potentially greater than those for 
securitizing prime loans. Accounting for the sale of subprime pools requires 
assumptions that can be difficult to quantify, and erroneous assumptions 
could lead to the significant overstatement of an institution’s assets. 
Moreover, the practice of providing support and substituting performing 
loans for nonperforming loans to maintain the desired level of performance 
on securitized pools has the effect of masking credit-quality problems. 
Institutions should recognize the volatility of the secondary market for 
subprime loans and the significant liquidity risk incurred when originating a 
large volume of loans intended for securitization and sale. Investors can 
quickly lose their appetite for risk in an economic downturn or when 
financial markets become volatile. As a result, institutions that have 
originated, but have not yet sold, pools of subprime loans may be forced to 
sell the pools at deep discounts.15 
 
The originate-to-distribute banking model experienced agency problems. The 
mortgage brokers who originated the loans had no incentive to make a strong effort 
to evaluate borrowers’ abilities to repay the loans. The brokers would quickly sell the 
loans to investors in the form of mortgage-backed securities, thus eliminating the 
risks of the loans. The more volume the brokers originated, the larger their fees. 
Consequently, adverse selection became a major problem. On the one hand risk-
loving investors had easy access to loans, but on the other hand, brokers encouraged 
households to take on mortgages they could not afford. The financial operations 
called “capital mortgage withdrawal” or “cash out” amplified this dynamic. Public 
government-sponsored enterprises contributed to asymmetric information in 
financial markets as they advised customers on how to structure complex financial 
instruments while, at the same time, rating those instruments. Their incentives to 
have accurate ratings were weak. 
These factors in the context of the increase in liquidity and low interest rates 
on residential mortgages made the subprime mortgage market greater than a trillion-
dollar market. While the subprime lenders represented only 9 percent of the real 
estate lenders in 2000, this proportion rose to 20 percent in 2006. Moreover, the 
average amount of credits granted to subprime lenders went up significantly during 
this period, in 2006 representing half of the average amount granted to prime 
lenders.16 As housing prices rose, so did profitability for mortgage originators and 
lenders, and the underwriting standards for subprime mortgages dropped 
significantly. Eventually, the housing price bubble burst leading to millions of 
mortgages in foreclosure. The crisis spread worldwide with substantial deterioration 
on the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions, a run on the shadow 
banking system, and the failure of major global companies. By 2009, housing prices 
had fallen by over 30 percent compared to the housing market peak of 2006. 
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2.6. Banking sector concentration 
 
During both periods, developments in finance modified the role of commercial 
banks. The banking sector became concentrated in the number and size of banks. 
“Small was no longer beautiful.” 
This evolution of the American commercial banks was explained in the 1920s 
by the fact that most banks engaged in fiduciary functions and in underwriting and 
distributing securities in an attempt to cope with the increasing size of companies, 
the declining importance of agriculture, and the rapid growth of industries (e.g., the 
auto industry). “All-Banks Statistics”17 indicates that the number of commercial banks 
in the United States rose from 27,000 in 1914 to 30,000 in 1921 and dropped to 
under 25,000 in 1929. This decline is explained partly by mergers, and partly by 
failure rates. The FDIC indicates that 6,000 commercial banks suspended their 
activities from 1921 through 1929. Most of the banks that suspended their activity 
during the period were small, that is, with capital of US$25,000, which confirms that 
these suspensions were the result of the concentration of the banking sector. 
In the 2000s, the concentration of the American and European banking 
sector is explained by the change from a financial intermediation bank model to an 
originate-to-distribute model, by new accounting and evaluation methods (“mark-to-
market”), the substantial development of “credit default swaps,” and credit risk 
models based on value-at-risk. This development gave birth to banks too big to fail. 
Historically, U.S. banking laws prohibited interstate banking and limited 
branch activity, restrictions that favored the existence of many small local banks. 
Even though these restrictions were removed in the 1990s as part of the process of 
authorizing and implementing interstate banking, at the end of 2001, more than 
8,000 insured commercial banks and about 1,500 insured savings institutions were 
still in operation in the United States. In 2001, almost three out of every four 
American banks was chartered and regulated at both the state and federal levels. Yet, 
the U.S. banking industry is less highly concentrated than the banking industries in 
many other industrial countries. For example, the Bank for International Settlements 
banking industry concentration ratio (a measure of the cumulative percentage share 
of deposits or assets as a share of total industry deposits or assets) for the five largest 
U.S. banks was 26.6 percent in 1999. Concentration ratios for Canada (77.1 percent), 
France (70.2 percent), and Switzerland (57.8 percent) exceed the ratio for the United 
States.18 The significant size of the United States may explain this relatively smaller 
concentration. What is certain is that just as in the 1920s, in the 1990s the American 
banking sector concentrated itself noticeably due to the evolution of the regulatory 
framework. 
Mergers in the European banking sector have taken place mainly within 
national markets, leading to the birth of so-called national bank champions, a 
preliminary step in cross-border expansion. Mergers and takeovers between smaller 
banks (in particular, in the savings bank and cooperative bank sectors) have the 
leading position in terms of number. The purpose of these mergers is frequently to 
reach an optimal bank size and ensure its survival. The optimal minimum size of a 
bank has increased in recent years because of the need to invest in banking 
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technology, to ensure efficient compliance with supervisory requirements, and to cut 
costs by exploiting rationalization potentials.19 
The mergers in the 1990s resulted in the creation of more than fifteen of the 
thirty largest banks in the euro area, and the average size of the five largest banks in 
Europe has doubled since 1995. As a result, the degree of concentration on the 
banking markets of many countries has greatly increased. Especially in the smaller 
countries of Europe, the five largest banks often account for more than 50 percent 
of the national market. In some countries concentration is even more significant. For 
example, in Belgium and the Netherlands, the two largest banking corporations 
account for over 90 percent of the total volume of business. In the larger countries, 
the degree of concentration is considerably lower, with Germany having the least 
concentrated banking market in the euro area, 20 percent. 20 
 
2.7. Excessive confidence in central banks 
 
In both periods, belief was strong that the central banks had the capacity to promote 
economic stability and to prevent financial crises in the long run. 
In the 1920s in the United States, hopes started being placed in the power of 
monetary policy regulation, as a result of a close connection in timing between 
explicit policy measures taken by the Federal Reserve System and movements in 
economic activity. 21 In early 1923, a rise in discount rates and sales of government 
securities was rapidly followed by a peak in business and the beginning of the 1923–
24 recession. An easing of policy in early 1924 was immediately followed by a 
vigorous cyclical revival. In the third quarter of 1926 moderate restraint was followed 
by a peak in October and in 1927, an ease in policy, and then by a cyclical depression 
in November. 
In the 2000s, the expectation of efficiency of the monetary machinery 
became even higher. After the dot-com crisis of 2001, monetary policy became 
strongly expansionist, which is normal after a crisis. But the problem was that this 
monetary expansion lasted. The Bank of England started raising funds rates slightly 
in 2003, the Federal Reserve in 2004, and the European Central Bank in 2005. This 
small and late restraint of monetary policy facilitated an excess of real estate debt and 
consequently created the real estate bubble.  
Even though increase in liquidity did not lead to rising prices for goods and 
services, it had a significant effect on the prices of assets, the offer of which could 
not absorb such excess liquidity. Real estate assets are among the assets that had 
substantial rises in price during this period. The conditions for building up a 
speculative bubble were created, and by 2003, some economists (e.g., Paul Krugman) 
feared that this would happen. But most economists as well as the Federal Reserve 
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Bank of New York explained the rise in real estate prices by the evolution of 
economic fundamentals. 22 
As mortgage loans are based on the value of real estate assets, the rise in 
price of those assets favours an increased volume of mortgage loans. Analyzing the 
American database of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), economists 
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven showed that lending standards 
declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price 
increases.23 This indicates that the financial intermediaries had bet on ongoing rises in 
real estate assets, implying that the borrowers could always pay back, even if, in the 
worst case scenario, they had to sell their home. 
Lending standards tend to be less severe in a period of credit expansion. The 
question is why the Federal Reserve did not raise funds rates since 2003 in order to 
avoid the worst. An explanation could be that when interest rates go down, the 
prices of assets go up. And, as many American households can increase their debt 
proportionally to the increase in market value of their home by retrieving the 
difference between the former and the new loan as extra capital (this financial 
operation is called “capital mortgage withdrawal” or “cash out”), a rise in interest 
rates would have led to a slow down first in household consumption, and second in 
the American economy. Is this why the Federal Reserve would not raise the funds 
rates? 
A certain amount of social pressure on the monetary policy of the Federal 
Reserve must also be considered, as low interest rates give access to property to less 
privileged social classes. Moreover, when real estate prices go up, it is even more 
important to keep funds rates low in order to facilitate access to property. 
But a delay in raising funds rates nourishes the inflationary spiral of the 
increase in prices of real estate assets. While the members of the Federal Reserve 
were aware of this, many believed that the outcome was positive. For example, in his 
speech titled “Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs and Challenges,” at the 
Annual Housing Meeting in Chicago on May 21, 2004, governor Edward M. 
Gramlich insisted that this monetary policy gave access to property to more than 9 
million Americans, half of whom were members of ethnic minorities. 
Indeed the global rate of access to property went from 64 percent in 1994 to 
68 percent in 2003, placing the United States at the same level as the United 
Kingdom in terms of access to property and just after Spain, Finland, Ireland, and 
Australia. Moreover, while the number of white homeowners rose by 4 million, that 
of African Americans rose by 1.2 million, of Hispanics by 1.9 million, and of other 
origins, including Asians by 1.6 millions. Consequently, in 2003, almost half of the 
Hispanic and African American households owned their main home.24 This was 
enormous progress even if the access to property of Hispanics and African 
Americans remained inferior to that of white homeowners. 
Another reason why the Federal Reserve would not raise the funds rates 
could have been the fact that the consumer price index was in itself showing no 
inflationary tendencies. But this could rather be explained by cheap import of 
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durable consumer goods from China and other emerging economies than by 
domestic factors. 
If the Federal Reserve had acted in time on the prices, could the crisis have 
been avoided? Can the subprime mortgage crisis be considered merely the result of a 
macroeconomic imbalance that could have been corrected by the competent and 
timely intervention of the central banks? If people had not relied so heavily on the 
efficiency of monetary policy, would this crisis have started? 
 
2.8. Consolidated powers of “young” central banks 
 
Both crises consolidated the powers of “young” central banks that were to become 
major players in the globalized economy by maintaining the stability of the financial 
system and containing systemic risk, by conducting monetary policy and thus 
influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economies of the United States 
and the European Union in pursuit of stable prices. The Great Depression 
consolidated the powers of the then “young” Federal Reserve System, and the 
subprime crisis that of the recently founded European Central Bank. 
The Federal Reserve Act established the Federal Reserve System in 1913. 
During the 1920s, the Federal Reserve Board consolidated its power. The 1929–33 
crisis had far-reaching effects on popular, political, and academic thinking about the 
influence of monetary policy on the market economy. It led to a thorough change 
and reinforcement of the powers of the Federal Reserve System. 
The European Central Bank was established in 1998 as an establishment even 
more independent of political pressures than the Federal Reserve System. The 
Federal Reserve System is considered to be an independent central bank because its 
decisions do not have to be ratified by the president of the United States or by the 
executive branch of government. It is, however, subject to oversight by the U.S. 
Congress. The Federal Reserve must work within the framework of the overall 
objectives of economic and financial policy established by the government. 
Therefore, in the document “The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions” 
in the “About the Fed” section of the Web site,25 the Federal Reserve System 
describes itself as “independent within the government.” The European Central 
Bank (ECB) is totally independent from the governments of the European Union. Its 
primary objective consists in ensuring price stability. The European political 
framework does not give a quantitative definition of this task, but the ECB’s 
Governing Council states: “Price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2 
percent.”26 
The power of the national central banks of the eurozone was centralized by 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Its management of the financial crisis 
consolidated the power of the monetary policy of the ECB in moderating the 
financial crisis and thus on protecting the economy of the European zone. In his 
speech, “The Monetary Policy of the ECB During the Financial Crisis,” of June 6, 
2011, Jean-Claude Trichet, first president of the European Central Bank summarized 
the achievements of the ECB since its creation in 1998 as follows: 
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Over these 12 years, the ECB has faced many challenges in pursuing its 
objective of price stability: the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the shock 
wave of September 11, 2001, the volatility of commodity prices and, of 
course, the worst financial crisis the world has known since the Second 
World War. . . . When the problems started to appear in the financial 
markets, on August 9, 2007, we were the first central bank to react, taking 
action very quickly.27 
 
As Trichet stated, this young institution that was the heart of the eurozone 
succeeded in imposing itself as an entity that was independent of political pressures.28 
 
2.9. Market speculations 
 
At the end of each period, in 1928 and 1929 and in 2008 and 2009, regulators wished 
to bring market speculations under control. Their action had little effect on 
speculation but it had a strong negative effect on expansion of the real economy. 
In 1928 and 1929, American stock-market prices doubled. The Federal 
Reserve considered the stock-market boom to be the result of excessive speculation. 
In order to limit speculations, the Banks led by New York, urged measures of higher 
discount rates and open market sales, while the Federal Reserve Board wanted to put 
direct pressure on banks making security loans. Finally, to limit the rise in stock 
prices, the Federal Reserve pursued a tightening of monetary policy. While the 
monetary policy adopted in 1928 and 1929 was not restrictive enough to limit 
speculation, it was too restrictive to encourage business expansion. The stock market 
crashed in October 1929, falling by 40 percent by the end of 1929. By June 1932, 
stock prices had declined to 10 percent of their value at the 1929 peak. 29 
The demand for financial deregulation, also called financial liberalization, is 
based on the belief that regulation restrains profits while deregulation means more 
profits. Deregulation is also supposed to render markets more competitive and 
benefit consumers and society at large. But in the short run, the elimination of 
restrictions on financial markets and institutions can prompt institutions to go on a 
lending spree. Lenders may not have the expertise, or the incentives, to manage risk 
appropriately in the new lines of business. The developing credit booms may 
eventually outstrip the capacity of banks and regulators to screen and monitor credit 
risks, leading to overly risky lending. What was needed in the nineties was not rapid 
deregulation, but reformed regulation—stronger regulation in certain areas such as 
accounting and weaker regulations in others, in order to ensure that markets worked 
competitively. Deregulation of the telecommunications sector paved the way for the 
investment bubble, which burst in 2001. Deregulation of banking—notably the 
repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act—opened up new opportunities for conflicts of 
interest that resulted in the 2007 financial crisis. 
The global regulatory standard on capital adequacy, stress testing, and market 
liquidity risk, called the Third Basel Agreement of the Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision, was the response to the market speculations revealed in the 2007 
financial crisis. The Third Basel Agreement strengthened bank capital requirements 
and introduced new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. 
The question is whether or not greater regulation was responsible for the slow 
recovery. In 2011, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) estimated that the implementation of the Third Basel Agreement from 2013 
until 2018 would decrease annual GDP growth by 0.05–0.15 percent.30 
 
2.10. International spillover effects 
 
The contractions of 1929 to 1933 and 2007 to 2011 are the most severe business-
cycle contractions in recent U.S. and European history. Both crises had international 
dimensions. Both started in the United States and spread to the rest of the world, 
resulting in a global depression. The eruption of both crises took place in August, in 
1929 and 2007, respectively. National bank “champions” went out of business during 
both periods. The 1929–33 contraction was the first American crisis of modern times 
to be broadly diffused internationally. The most severe and long-lasting crisis in U.S. 
history, it can be considered the first global systemic financial crisis. The worldwide 
depression caused severe hardship for millions of people out of work. The resulting 
social discontent led to the rise of fascism and World War II. 
From the cyclical peak of August 1929 to March 1933 more than one-fifth of 
the commercial banks holding almost one-tenth of the volume of deposits before the 
beginning of the crisis were forced to suspend operations because of financial 
difficulties. Over this period, the number of commercial banks fell by more than 
one-third because of liquidations, mergers, and consolidations. The contraction was 
capped by banking holidays in many states in early 1933. President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 2039, declaring a nationwide “bank holiday,” closing not only 
commercial banks but also Federal Reserve Banks in the United States, and freezing 
all financial transactions. The “holiday” ended on March 13 for the twelve Federal 
Reserve Banks, and on March 15 for all banks, which then had to apply for licenses. 
After the holiday, 2,000 banks did not reopen.31 On the same day, President 
Roosevelt placed an embargo on the export of gold and suspended payments in gold 
to satisfy government obligations. At the end of the crisis, federal insurance for bank 
deposits was enacted and the powers of the Federal Reserve System were thoroughly 
modified. 
Like the Great Depression, the Subprime Crisis originated in the United 
States. But the signal for the beginning of the financial crisis is believed to have come 
from the European Union. After Standard & Poor’s and Fitch announced ratings 
downgrades on mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations for 
more than $10 billion, on August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas, a French investment bank 
suspended redemption of shares held in three of its money market funds that had 
sustained large losses. The same day the European Central Bank injected €95 billion 
of liquidity into the financial system and the Federal Reserve System, $24 billion, 
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followed by a liquidity injection of $38 billion the next day, another $38 billion on 
September 27, and $41 billion dollars on November 1. 32 
The signal for the beginning of the financial crisis came from a French bank 
while its origin was in the United States and the first intervention of the European 
Central Bank was less timid than that of the Federal Reserve System. This shows 
how extensive the globalization of financial markets had become and how 
international this financial crisis was from its very beginning. 
 
2.11. High Uncertainty 
 
Both financial crises emerged during periods of high uncertainty, after the failure of a 
major American financial institution, the Bank of the United States in 1930 and 
Lehman Brothers in 2008. 
In November 1930, the deposits of suspended banks were more than double 
the highest value recorded since 1921. The rapid development of postal saving 
deposits from 1929 to 1933 is a good measure of the spread of distrust of banks and 
of the development of the contagion of fear among depositors. Postal saving rose 
from $57 million in November 1914 to $100 million in August 1929, and to $190 
million in October 1930. From October 1930 to March 1933, postal savings deposits 
rose to $1.1 billion. The failure of 256 banks with $180 million in deposits in 
November 1930 was followed by the failure of 352 banks with $370 million in 
deposits in December. The Bank of the United States, the largest U.S. commercial 
bank with over $200 million dollars in deposits, failed on December 11.33 Although it 
was an ordinary bank, its distinctive name, size, and membership in the Federal 
Reserve System caused its failure to have systemic consequences that shook not only 
the American financial system but also the systems of all of the advanced economies. 
On March 4, 1933, in his first inaugural address Franklin D. Roosevelt defined the 
very essence of the crisis, saying: “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”34 
The effect of the subprime financial crisis on balance sheets threw the major 
players of the financial markets into turmoil and forced them to take radical actions. 
In September 2007, the United Kingdom was confronted with a bank run of 
Northern Rock bank depositors. It was the first bank run in more than 100 years. 
Northern Rock was specialized in mortgages, which represented 70 percent of its 
assets. In order to put an end to this bank run, on September 17, 2007, the British 
government announced that the government would guarantee all Northern Rock’s 
deposits during the whole period of the financial crisis. This statement was associated 
with emergency funding of £20 billion. This loan allowed the bank to continue its 
activities and stopped the bank run. After this bailout, Northern Rock continued 
negotiations with potential private buyers such as J.C. Flowers, Citigroup, and Virgin 
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group. As negotiations failed, the British government had no choice but to 
nationalize Northern Rock on February 17, 2008. 35 
In March 2008, Bear Stearns, the fifth-largest U.S. investment bank, which 
had mainly invested in subprime-related securities, had a run on its repo funding and 
was forced to sell itself to J.P. Morgan for less than 5 percent of what it was worth 
just a year earlier, and only after the Federal Reserve took over $30 billion of Bear 
Stearns’s complex assets. 
In July 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two public government-
sponsored enterprises that together insured more than $5 trillion dollars in mortgages 
or mortgaged-backed assets, were propped up by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. 
Treasury after suffering considerable losses from their holdings of subprime 
securities. In September 2008, they were put into conservatorship. In other words, 
the two public government-sponsored enterprises - which rate the quality of debt 
securities worldwide in terms of the probability of default in order to improve the 
transparency of financial information by reducing asymmetric information in 
financial markets - instead of limiting the crisis, amplified it. Thus, they were able to 
avoid going bankrupt only thanks to government intervention. 
On September 14, 2008, Merrill Lynch, the third-largest investment bank, 
which also suffered large losses on its holdings of subprime securities, announced its 
sale to Bank of America for a price of 60 percent below its value a year earlier. 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment 
bank with over $600 billion in assets and 25,000 employees, filed for bankruptcy. It is 
the most significant bankruptcy filing in U.S. history. 
On September 16, 2008, AIG, an insurance company with assets of over $1 
trillion, had its credit rating downgraded and consequently lost liquidity. It had 
written over $400 billion in credit default swaps that had to make payouts on 
probable losses from subprime mortgage securities. The Federal Reserve made an 
initial loan of $85 billion to keep AIG afloat. The total amount of loans made by the 
American government to AIG rose to $173 billion. 36 
 
2.12. Major bank failures  
 
The closing of the Bank of the United States could have been avoided. 
Joseph A. Broderick, New York State superintendent of banks had sponsored a 
merger plan that could have saved the bank. Governor George Leslie Harrison 
devised the final reorganization plan: the Bank of the United States was to merge 
with Manufacturers Trust, Public National, and International Trust. The success of 
the plan seemed so likely that, two days before the bank closed, the Federal Reserve 
Bank issued a statement naming proposed directors for the merger. But at the 
meeting held at the New York Bank, the Clearing House banks decided not to save 
the bank and withdrew from the arrangement whereby they would have subscribed 
$30 million dollars in new capital funds to the newly created bank. Broderick warned 
them that it was “the most colossal mistake in the banking history of New York,”37 
that “its closing would result in the closing of at least 10 other banks in the city and 
                                                          
35 ‘Report 78 of the Conseil d’Analyse économique’ (September 2008), La crise des subprimes, La 
documentation française, p. 19, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-
publics/084000588/> 
36
 Peicuti C. (2010), Crédit, destabilisation et crises, Paris, L’Harmattan, p. 144-145 
37
 Commercial and Financial Chronicle (May 21, 1932), p. 3744–45 
16 
 
that it might affect the savings bank.”38 He reminded them “that only two or three 
weeks before they had rescued two of the largest private bankers of the city and had 
willingly put up the money needed. . . . that only seven or eight years before they had 
come to the aid of one of the biggest trust companies in New York, putting up many 
times the sum needed to save the Bank of the United States.”39 Jackson Reynolds, 
president of the First National Bank and of the Clearing House Association told him 
that the decision to drop the rescue plan was final and that the effect of the closing 
would be only local. Broderick stated: “I considered the bank solvent as a going 
concern and I was at a loss to understand the attitude of askance which the Clearing 
House banks had adopted toward the real estate holdings of the Bank of United 
States. I told them I thought it was because none of other banks had ever been 
interested in this field and therefore knew nothing of it.”40 And as it turned out, 
despite the fact that the Bank of the United States had to liquidate a large fraction of 
its assets during the severely difficult financial circumstances of the next two years, it 
ultimately paid off 83.5 percent of its adjusted liabilities at its closing on December 
11, 1930. 
How could a large-sized company such as Lehman with a track record of 
huge profits, become so helpless in 2008 that it had to file for bankruptcy? 
Undoubtedly, the financial scenario in the United States had become bad, especially 
for those companies involved in mortgage banking but was its failure inevitable? In 
his testimony, “Lessons from the Failure of Lehman Brothers,” before the 
Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Ben S. 
Bernanke states that Lehman’s failure was inevitable: 
 
The Federal Reserve fully understood that the failure of Lehman would shake 
the financial system and economy. However, the only tool available to the 
Federal Reserve to address the situation was its ability to provide short-term 
liquidity against adequate collateral; and . . . Lehman already had access to 
[the Federal Reserve’s] emergency credit facilities. It was clear, though, that 
Lehman needed both substantial capital and an open-ended guarantee of its 
obligations to open for business on Monday, September 15. At that time, 
neither the Federal Reserve nor any other agency had the authority to provide 
capital or an unsecured guarantee, and thus no means of preventing 
Lehman’s failure existed. 41 
 
One of the reasons for the failure concerns the fact that Chairman Bernanke did not 
believe the Federal Bank Reserve had the legal authority to recapitalize Lehman as it 
had helped to do with Bear Stearns. He did not believe that the Federal Reserve of 
New York could lend to Lehman because Lehman had no collateral to secure such a 
loan. Treasury secretary Henry Paulson shared this point of view. Paulson made a 
distinction between Lehman and Bear Stearns because unlike Bear Stearns, which 
had what he called a willing buyer in J.P. Morgan, Lehman did not. Yet, J.P. Morgan 
was willing to invest in Bear Stearns only under the condition that the Federal 
Reserve Bank provide $30 billion in financing and remove the risky real estate 
portfolio from the Bear Stearns balance sheet. 
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As Bernanke also explained at the beginning of his testimony, Lehman had 
succeeded in raising around $6 billion in capital in June 2008, and took steps to 
improve its liquidity position in July, but in August and early September 2008, 
increasingly panicky conditions in markets put Lehman under severe pressure. Just as 
for the Bank of the United States, the negotiations for the rescue of Lehman took 
place at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. During the weekend of September 
13–15, the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) brought together leaders of the major financial firms but no 
acquisition of Lehman could be arranged. 
Lehman might have been rescued by Barclays, but whereas the U.S. 
government had been willing to provide $30 billion to finance the Bear Stearns 
acquisition, it seemed unwilling to provide such financing to Barclays. Moreover, the 
main sticking point for Barclays and its U.K. regulators and the U.S. regulators 
appeared to be a requirement from the U.S. regulators that Barclay guarantee 
Lehman’s obligations in the same way that J.P. Morgan guaranteed those of Bear 
Stearns. 42 
Lehman’s failure may have struck a blow against moral hazard by sending a 
clear message to financial firms that they could not rely on the American government 
to bail them out, and that no financial firm was too big to fail. But this public policy 
benefit cannot justify the enormous losses in wealth caused by this failure not only 
within Lehman. Bryan Marsal, Lehman’s chief restructuring officer, estimated that 
total losses at Lehman reached between $50 billion and $75 billion,43 but also 
affected entities all over the world that had no connection to Lehman. 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, one money market fund that held 
commercial paper issued by Lehman failed to maintain a share price of one dollar. 
This dramatic decrease in share price led to a rapid loss of confidence by investors in 
other money markets funds and developed into a panic. The Treasury provided a 
temporary guarantee of the value of the shares of money market funds. The Federal 
Reserve, acting as lender of last resort, launched a program to provide backstop 
liquidity. Under this program, the Federal Reserve provided cash to money market 
funds by purchasing some of their assets. Money market funds responded to the 
panic by curtailing their purchases of commercial paper. The demand for newly 
issued commercial papers dried up and interest rates on commercial papers soared. 
This led to an overall contraction in credit available to financial institutions and to 
nonfinancial firms. The Federal Reserve established special programs to restart the 
flow of credit. Spending and output contracted sharply in response to reduced credit 
flows, and significantly increased the costs of borrowing costs, causing asset values to 
drop. Gross domestic product fell by a total of more than 5 percent, manufacturing 
output declined by 20 percent, and new home construction by 80 percent. More than 
8.5 million Americans lost their jobs and unemployment in the United States rose to 
10 percent. The financial crisis spread all over the world with long-term economic 
consequences. The threat of a second Great Depression became real. 
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3. Conclusion 
The Great Depression of the 1930s led to the disappearance of globalization at that 
time. International flows of capital diminished, international trade became very 
difficult to finance, and, one after another, countries adopted protectionist measures. 
From June 12 to July 27, 1933, Great Britain organized a summit of representatives 
of sixty-six nations in order to try to find an international solution to the global 
depression, to revive international trade, and stabilize currency exchange rates. But 
the London Economic Conference failed. It signalled the death of the international 
monetary system. 
The impossibility of devising an international agreement meant the death of 
multilateralism. And the paralysis of global trade amplified the economic crisis 
triggered by the financial crisis. Cures for the depression were national. Germany, 
with the rise of Nazism, chose to nationalize the entire economy. The United States 
adopted border taxes and opted for the Keynesian solution of the New Deal. 
Roosevelt took the United States off the gold standard. The American financial 
system responded only to American regulations. Countries such as France became 
stuck in deflation. The Great Depression led to a total explosion of the world 
economy, an implosion of international relations, and the nationalist withdrawal of 
each country. 
Like the Great Depression, the Great Recession is a turning point in history. 
It has restructured world economic dynamics. The Great Recession has not ended 
the second globalization but it should reshape it. We should assist to reversing 
financial flows. The merging countries have begun to experience vigorous growth 
since the second half of 2009, i.e. much quicker than the advanced countries. In the 
long run, the advanced countries may be less advanced and the emerging countries, 
more emerged. But the crucial difference from what happened in the 1930s is today’s 
almost unanimous will of governments worldwide to keep globalization going, as 
stated in all the G20 summits from the beginning of the crisis. 
Even if the governments, the central banks and the regulatory authorities 
failed to prevent the build-up of circumstances similar to those that led to the Great 
Depression, once the subprime crisis erupted, they demonstrated what they had 
learned from the mistakes of the 1930s, and they succeeded in the world’s emergence 
from the financial crisis without war. But the devastating consequences of the Great 
Recession in the economies of the advanced countries are here to last. History will 
tell what the Great Recession has really cost to the United States and Europe. 
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